Who Is Ousmane Bin Laden?
by Michel Chossudovsky
Professor of Economics, University of Ottawa
Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG), Montréal
Posted 12 September 2001
A few hours after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Centre and the Pentagon, the Bush administration
concluded without supporting evidence, that "Ousmane bin
Laden and his al-Qaeda organisation were prime suspects".
CIA Director George Tenet stated that bin Laden has the
capacity to plan ``multiple attacks with little or no warning.''
Secretary of State Colin Powell called the attacks "an act of
war" and President Bush confirmed in an evening televised
address to the Nation that he would "make no distinction
between the terrorists who committed these acts and those
who harbor them". Former CIA Director James Woolsey
pointed his finger at "state sponsorship," implying the
complicity of one or more foreign governments. In the words
of former National Security Adviser, Lawrence Eagleburger,
"I think we will show when we get attacked like this, we are
terrible in our strength and in our retribution."
Meanwhile, parroting official statements, the Western media
mantra has approved the launching of "punitive actions"
directed against civilian targets in the Middle East. In the
words of William Saffire writing in the New York Times:
"When we reasonably determine our attackers' bases and
camps, we must pulverize them -- minimizing but accepting
the risk of collateral damage" -- and act overtly or covertly to
destabilize terror's national hosts".
The following text outlines the history of Ousmane Bin
Laden and the links of the Islamic "Jihad" to the formulation
of US foreign policy during the Cold War and its aftermath.
Prime suspect in the New York and Washington terrorists
attacks, branded by the FBI as an "international terrorist" for
his role in the African US embassy bombings, Saudi born
Ousmane bin Laden was recruited during the Soviet-Afghan
war "ironically under the auspices of the CIA, to fight Soviet
invaders". 1
In 1979 "the largest covert operation in the history of the
CIA" was launched in response to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in support of the pro-Communist government of
Babrak Kamal.2:
With the active encouragement of the CIA and
Pakistan's ISI [Inter Services Intelligence], who
wanted to turn the Afghan jihad into a global war
waged by all Muslim states against the Soviet
Union, some 35,000 Muslim radicals from 40
Islamic countries joined Afghanistan's fight
between 1982 and 1992. Tens of thousands more
came to study in Pakistani madrasahs. Eventually
more than 100,000 foreign Muslim radicals were
directly influenced by the Afghan jihad.3
The Islamic "jihad" was supported by the United States and
Saudi Arabia with a significant part of the funding generated
from the Golden Crescent drug trade:
In March 1985, President Reagan signed National
Security Decision Directive 166,...[which]
authorize[d] stepped-up covert military aid to the
mujahideen, and it made clear that the secret
Afghan war had a new goal: to defeat Soviet
troops in Afghanistan through covert action and
encourage a Soviet withdrawal. The new covert
U.S. assistance began with a dramatic increase in
arms supplies -- a steady rise to 65,000 tons
annually by 1987, ... as well as a "ceaseless
stream" of CIA and Pentagon specialists who
traveled to the secret headquarters of Pakistan's
ISI on the main road near Rawalpindi, Pakistan.
There the CIA specialists met with Pakistani
intelligence officers to help plan operations for the
Afghan rebels.4
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) using Pakistan's
military Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) played a key role in
training the Mujahideen. In turn, the CIA sponsored guerrilla
training was integrated with the teachings of Islam:
Predominant themes were that Islam was a
complete socio-political ideology, that holy Islam
was being violated by the atheistic Soviet troops,
and that the Islamic people of Afghanistan should
reassert their independence by overthrowing the
leftist Afghan regime propped up by Moscow.5
Pakistan's Intelligence Apparatus
Pakistan's ISI was used as a "go-between". The CIA covert
support to the "jihad" operated indirectly through the
Pakistani ISI, --i.e. the CIA did not channel its support
directly to the Mujahideen. In other words, for these covert
operations to be "successful", Washington was careful not
to reveal the ultimate objective of the "jihad", which
consisted in destroying the Soviet Union.
In the words of CIA's Milton Beardman "We didn't train
Arabs". Yet according to Abdel Monam Saidali, of the
Al-aram Center for Strategic Studies in Cairo, bin Laden
and the "Afghan Arabs" had been imparted "with very
sophisticated types of training that was allowed to them by
the CIA" 6
CIA's Beardman confirmed, in this regard, that Ousmane bin
Laden was not aware of the role he was playing on behalf
of Washington. In the words of bin Laden (quoted by
Beardman): "neither I, nor my brothers saw evidence of
American help". 7
Motivated by nationalism and religious fervor, the Islamic
warriors were unaware that they were fighting the Soviet
Army on behalf of Uncle Sam. While there were contacts at
the upper levels of the intelligence hierarchy, Islamic rebel
leaders in theatre had no contacts with Washington or the
CIA.
With CIA backing and the funneling of massive amounts of
US military aid, the Pakistani ISI had developed into a
"parallel structure wielding enormous power over all aspects
of government". 8 The ISI had a staff composed of military
and intelligence officers, bureaucrats, undercover agents
and informers, estimated at 150,000. 9
Meanwhile, CIA operations had also reinforced the
Pakistani military regime led by General Zia Ul Haq:
'Relations between the CIA and the ISI [Pakistan's
military intelligence] had grown increasingly warm
following [General] Zia's ouster of Bhutto and the
advent of the military regime,'... During most of
the Afghan war, Pakistan was more aggressively
anti-Soviet than even the United States. Soon
after the Soviet military invaded Afghanistan in
1980, Zia [ul Haq] sent his ISI chief to destabilize
the Soviet Central Asian states. The CIA only
agreed to this plan in October 1984.... `the CIA
was more cautious than the Pakistanis.' Both
Pakistan and the United States took the line of
deception on Afghanistan with a public posture of
negotiating a settlement while privately agreeing
that military escalation was the best course.10
The Golden Crescent Drug Triangle
The history of the drug trade in Central Asia is intimately
related to the CIA's covert operations. Prior to the
Soviet-Afghan war, opium production in Afghanistan and
Pakistan was directed to small regional markets. There was
no local production of heroin. 11 In this regard, Alfred
McCoy's study confirms that within two years of the
onslaught of the CIA operation in Afghanistan, "the
Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands became the world's top
heroin producer, supplying 60 percent of U.S. demand. In
Pakistan, the heroin-addict population went from near zero
in 1979... to 1.2 million by 1985 -- a much steeper rise than
in any other nation":12
CIA assets again controlled this heroin trade. As
the Mujahideen guerrillas seized territory inside
Afghanistan, they ordered peasants to plant
opium as a revolutionary tax. Across the border in
Pakistan, Afghan leaders and local syndicates
under the protection of Pakistan Intelligence
operated hundreds of heroin laboratories. During
this decade of wide-open drug-dealing, the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Agency in Islamabad failed to
instigate major seizures or arrests ... U.S. officials
had refused to investigate charges of heroin
dealing by its Afghan allies `because U.S.
narcotics policy in Afghanistan has been
subordinated to the war against Soviet influence
there.' In 1995, the former CIA director of the
Afghan operation, Charles Cogan, admitted the
CIA had indeed sacrificed the drug war to fight the
Cold War. `Our main mission was to do as much
damage as possible to the Soviets. We didn't
really have the resources or the time to devote to
an investigation of the drug trade,'... `I don't think
that we need to apologize for this. Every situation
has its fallout.... There was fallout in terms of
drugs, yes. But the main objective was
accomplished. The Soviets left Afghanistan.'13
In the Wake of the Cold War
In the wake of the Cold War, the Central Asian region is not
only strategic for its extensive oil reserves, it also produces
three quarters of the World's opium representing multibillion
dollar revenues to business syndicates, financial
institutions, intelligence agencies and organized crime. The
annual proceeds of the Golden Crescent drug trade
(between 100 and 200 billion dollars) represents
approximately one third of the Worldwide annual turnover of
narcotics, estimated by the United Nations to be of the
order of $500 billion.14
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a new surge in
opium production has unfolded. (According to UN estimates,
the production of opium in Afghanistan in 1998-99 --
coinciding with the build up of armed insurgencies in the
former Soviet republics-- reached a record high of 4600
metric tons.15 Powerful business syndicates in the former
Soviet Union allied with organized crime are competing for
the strategic control over the heroin routes.
The ISI's extensive intelligence military-network was not
dismantled in the wake of the Cold War. The CIA continued
to support the Islamic "jihad" out of Pakistan. New
undercover initiatives were set in motion in Central Asia, the
Caucasus and the Balkans. Pakistan's military and
intelligence apparatus essentially "served as a catalyst for
the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of
six new Muslim republics in Central Asia." 16.
Meanwhile, Islamic missionaries of the Wahhabi sect from
Saudi Arabia had established themselves in the Muslim
republics as well as within the Russian federation
encroaching upon the institutions of the secular State.
Despite its anti-American ideology, Islamic fundamentalism
was largely serving Washington's strategic interests in the
former Soviet Union.
Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, the civil
war in Afghanistan continued unabated. The Taliban were
being supported by the Pakistani Deobandis and their
political party the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). In 1993,
JUI entered the government coalition of Prime Minister
Benazzir Bhutto. Ties between JUI, the Army and ISI were
established. In 1995, with the downfall of the Hezb-I-Islami
Hektmatyar government in Kabul, the Taliban not only
instated a hardline Islamic government, they also "handed
control of training camps in Afghanistan over to JUI
factions..." 17
And the JUI with the support of the Saudi Wahhabi
movements played a key role in recruiting volunteers to fight
in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.
Jane Defense Weekly confirms in this regard that "half of
Taliban manpower and equipment originate[d] in Pakistan
under the ISI" 18
In fact, it would appear that following the Soviet withdrawal
both sides in the Afghan civil war continued to receive
covert support through Pakistan's ISI. 19
In other words, backed by Pakistan's military intelligence
(ISI) which in turn was controlled by the CIA, the Taliban
Islamic State was largely serving American geopolitical
interests. The Golden Crescent drug trade was also being
used to finance and equip the Bosnian Muslim Army
(starting in the early 1990s) and the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA). In last few months there is evidence that Mujahideen
mercenaries are fighting in the ranks of KLA-NLA terrorists
in their assaults into Macedonia.
No doubt, this explains why Washington has closed its eyes
on the reign of terror imposed by the Taliban including the
blatant derogation of women's rights, the closing down of
schools for girls, the dismissal of women employees from
government offices and the enforcement of "the Sharia laws
of punishment".20
The War in Chechnya
With regard to Chechnya, the main rebel leaders Shamil
Basayev and Al Khattab were trained and indoctrinated in
CIA sponsored camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
According to Yossef Bodansky, director of the U.S.
Congress's Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional
Warfare, the war in Chechnya had been planned during a
secret summit of HizbAllah International held in 1996 in
Mogadishu, Somalia. 21 The summit, was attended by
Osama bin Laden and high-ranking Iranian and Pakistani
intelligence officers. In this regard, the involvement of
Pakistan's ISI in Chechnya "goes far beyond supplying the
Chechens with weapons and expertise: the ISI and its
radical Islamic proxies are actually calling the shots in this
war". 22
Russia's main pipeline route transits through Chechnya and
Dagestan. Despite Washington's perfunctory condemnation
of Islamic terrorism, the indirect beneficiaries of the
Chechen war are the Anglo-American oil conglomerates
which are vying for control over oil resources and pipeline
corridors out of the Caspian Sea basin.
The two main Chechen rebel armies (respectively led by
Commander Shamil Basayev and Emir Khattab) estimated
at 35,000 strong were supported by Pakistan's ISI, which
also played a key role in organizing and training the
Chechen rebel army:
[In 1994] the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence
arranged for Basayev and his trusted lieutenants
to undergo intensive Islamic indoctrination and
training in guerrilla warfare in the Khost province
of Afghanistan at Amir Muawia camp, set up in the
early 1980s by the CIA and ISI and run by famous
Afghani warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In July
1994, upon graduating from Amir Muawia,
Basayev was transferred to Markaz-i-Dawar camp
in Pakistan to undergo training in advanced
guerrilla tactics. In Pakistan, Basayev met the
highest ranking Pakistani military and intelligence
officers: Minister of Defense General Aftab
Shahban Mirani, Minister of Interior General
Naserullah Babar, and the head of the ISI branch
in charge of supporting Islamic causes, General
Javed Ashraf, (all now retired). High-level
connections soon proved very useful to
Basayev.23
Following his training and indoctrination stint, Basayev was
assigned to lead the assault against Russian federal troops
in the first Chechen war in 1995. His organization had also
developed extensive links to criminal syndicates in Moscow
as well as ties to Albanian organized crime and the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA). In 1997-98, according to Russia's
Federal Security Service (FSB) "Chechen warlords started
buying up real estate in Kosovo... through several real
estate firms registered as a cover in Yugoslavia" 24
Basayev's organisation has also been involved in a number
of rackets including narcotics, illegal tapping and sabotage
of Russia's oil pipelines, kidnapping, prostitution, trade in
counterfeit dollars and the smuggling of nuclear materials
(See Mafia linked to Albania's collapsed pyramids, 25
Alongside the extensive laundering of drug money, the
proceeds of various illicit activities have been funneled
towards the recruitment of mercenaries and the purchase of
weapons.
During his training in Afghanistan, Shamil Basayev linked
up with Saudi born veteran Mujahideen Commander "Al
Khattab" who had fought as a volunteer in Afghanistan.
Barely a few months after Basayev's return to Grozny,
Khattab was invited (early 1995) to set up an army base in
Chechnya for the training of Mujahideen fighters. According
to the BBC, Khattab's posting to Chechnya had been
"arranged through the Saudi-Arabian based [International]
Islamic Relief Organisation, a militant religious organisation,
funded by mosques and rich individuals which channeled
funds into Chechnya".26
Concluding Remarks
Since the Cold War era, Washington has consciously
supported Ousmane bin Laden, while at same time placing
him on the FBI's "most wanted list" as the World's foremost
terrorist.
While the Mujahideen are busy fighting America's war in the
Balkans and the former Soviet Union, the FBI --operating as
a US based Police Force- is waging a domestic war against
terrorism, operating in some respects independently of the
CIA which has --since the Soviet-Afghan war-- supported
international terrorism through its covert operations.
In a cruel irony, while the Islamic jihad --featured by the
Bush Adminstration as "a threat to America"-- is blamed for
the terrorist assaults on the World Trade Centre and the
Pentagon, these same Islamic organisations constitute a
key instrument of US military-intelligence operations in the
Balkans and the former Soviet Union.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington, the truth must prevail to prevent the Bush
Adminstration together with its NATO partners from
embarking upon a military adventure which threatens the
future of humanity.
Endnotes
1.Hugh Davies, International: `Informers' point the finger
at bin Laden; Washington on alert for suicide bombers,
The Daily Telegraph, London, 24 August 1998.
2.See Fred Halliday, "The Un-great game: the Country
that lost the Cold War, Afghanistan, New Republic, 25
March 1996):
3.Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban: Exporting Extremism,
Foreign Affairs, November-December 1999.
4.Steve Coll, Washington Post, July 19, 1992.
5.Dilip Hiro, Fallout from the Afghan Jihad, Inter Press
Services, 21 November 1995.
6.Weekend Sunday (NPR); Eric Weiner, Ted Clark; 16
August 1998.
7.Ibid.
8.Dipankar Banerjee; Possible Connection of ISI With
Drug Industry, India Abroad, 2 December 1994.
9.Ibid
10.See Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, Out of
Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet
Withdrawal, Oxford university Press, New York, 1995.
See also the review of Cordovez and Harrison in
International Press Services, 22 August 1995.
11.Alfred McCoy, Drug fallout: the CIA's Forty Year
Complicity in the Narcotics Trade. The Progressive; 1
August 1997.
12.Ibid
13.Ibid.
14.Douglas Keh, Drug Money in a changing World,
Technical document no 4, 1998, Vienna UNDCP, p. 4.
See also Report of the International Narcotics Control
Board for 1999, E/INCB/1999/1 United Nations
Publication, Vienna 1999, p 49-51, And Richard
Lapper, UN Fears Growth of Heroin Trade, Financial
Times, 24 February 2000.
15.Report of the International Narcotics Control Board, op
cit, p 49-51, see also Richard Lapper, op. cit.
16.International Press Services, 22 August 1995.
17.Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban: Exporting Extremism,
Foreign Affairs, November- December, 1999, p. 22.
18.Quoted in the Christian Science Monitor, 3 September
1998)
19.Tim McGirk, Kabul learns to live with its bearded
conquerors, The Independent, London, 6
November1996.
20.See K. Subrahmanyam, Pakistan is Pursuing Asian
Goals, India Abroad, 3 November 1995.
21.Levon Sevunts, Who's calling the shots?: Chechen
conflict finds Islamic roots in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
23 The Gazette, Montreal, 26 October 1999..
22.Ibid
23.Ibid.
24.See Vitaly Romanov and Viktor Yadukha, Chechen
Front Moves To Kosovo Segodnia, Moscow, 23 Feb
2000.
25.The European, 13 February 1997, See also Itar-Tass,
4-5 January 2000.
26.BBC, 29 September 1999).
The URL of this article is:
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO109C.html
Copyright Michel Chossudovsky, Montreal, September
2001. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to post this
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